On Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia, Part One

The United States being as new as it is in the greater scheme of things makes us think of wars being based on relatively recent matters – after all, all of ours are. Europe of course shows us over an over again that the roots of wars run very deep, often centuries of hatred. An assassination might have launched World War I, but the reasons behind it were ages old hatreds. That war never really ended, either, with the Treaty of Versailles doing little more than clamp down some of the hatreds temporarily – most erupting just decades later in World War II, others taking nearly a century to boil over, such as the former Yugoslavia and the current situation in Iraq.

The ethnic hatreds and feuds of Eastern Europe and Central Asia follow a similar pattern, with centuries of hostilities kept under wraps by brutal dictatorships, with the rage boiling over in to violence with the yolk of oppression finally removed.  With the fall of the Soviet Union, rather than working together to advance mutual goals, too many of the peoples of this former empire have instead chosen to try to once again kill one another.

The conflict boiling over in South Ossetia today is far from a new one. A Persian people surrounded by ethnicities with nothing in common with them, Ossetians have found themselves trapped for centuries between the Russians and Georgians. In 1801, the swallowing of Georgia by the Russian Empire would temporarily reunite Ossetians under one rule – albeit not their own – and conflict would be stifled, for now.

With the fall of the Empire, the tensions would flare up again, and rival Communist forces would use the two sides to fight their battles, with the Menshevik Georgians facing uprisings from 1918 through 1920 in the region now known as South Ossetia, with the Ossetians receiving support from the Bolsheviks. In 1921, Georgian independence would come to an end, with Ossetians being a contributing force to this, as they would aid the invading Red Army. If the Ossetians could not be free, neither would the Georgians.

The reward for the Ossetians would be a modicum of their own autonomy, as the Soviets would carve out the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast for them, although autonomy under Soviet rule is far from true autonomy. Still, this semi-independence would last until 1990, when the Georgian SSR would dissolve it, shortly before the Georgian SSR itself would dissolve, transforming in to the Republic of Georgia, which officially declared its independence from the USSR on April 9, 1991.

Before declaring their independence, Georgians would first declare war on the Ossetians. Conflict would continue from January 1991 through June 1992, with the result being over 1,000 dead and approximately 110, 000 refugees. [i] The result of the war would be the creation of a semi-autonomous region of South Ossetia within Georgia, operating as a de facto state of its own, with peacekeeping forces consisting of Russian, North Ossetian (which, technically, would also be Russian), and Georgian forces.

While a semblance of peace and semi-autonomy were established, it was not enough for the South Ossetians, who voted in 1992 for independence and who have continued to press for it.  A second referendum, monitored by international organizations, saw 95% of the populace vote in favor of secession from Georgia. However, there were questions about the legitimacy of this vote, based on the lack of involvement by ethnic Georgians.

In fact, many Georgians, along with a minority of Ossetians, participated in counter-elections, forming an opposition government to the opposition government already operating within South Ossetia. Neither government has received international recognition, but many Ossetians had seen the newer of the two, led by Dmitri Sanakoev, who had formerly been a minister within the initial breakaway government, as a further interference by Georgians in their affairs and a puppet government of the Georgians. Georgia did itself little good in this regard by later giving semi-recognition to the latter of the two governments, dubbing them the “Provisional Administrative Entity of South Ossetia.” As the International Crisis Group observed, “The establishment of Dmitri Sanakoev and his alternative power centre in the Georgian-administered areas in the zone of conflict is alienating the broader Ossetian constituency.” [ii]

After recognizing the government more friendly to their cause, Georgia attempted to use the carrot rather than the stick in attempting to rein in the South Ossetians. Georgia would invest heavily in the development of Kurta, the capital of the Sanakoev government, during 2007, with $10 million in Georgian funds going towards shops, a movie theatre, and a hotel. [iii]

The trigger for the latest violence is not anything occurring in the Caucasus but in the Balkans. As Kosovo pushed for independence, Russia, which opposed such a move due to their historical alliances with Serbia, warned that what was good for Kosovo would be good for other areas as well. Former Russian President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has stated, “If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?” [iv] The Russians warned of this again in February, as the Russian foreign ministry released a statement saying, "We will, without doubt, have to take into account a declaration and recognition of Kosovo independence in connection with the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” [v]  Further angering Russia were overtures from NATO that they would welcome Georgia in to the organization. This move, which Russians felt was an intrusion upon their sphere, led to a further supporting of separatists within the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. [vi]

Minor skirmishes kicked off the beginning of August, and Russia began allowing refugees from South Ossetia to evacuate into North Ossetia on Sunday, August 3. By Friday, over 2,000 had done so. [vii] By Thursday, these minor skirmishes became a bombardment of Tskhinvali, the capital of the separatist government, by Georgian forces, and a ground invasion on August 8. While Georgian forces early on would take the city, the tide turned quickly.

By the end of Friday, joint Russian/Ossetian forces would retake Tskhinvali, with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili stating that 150 Russian tanks had crossed the Georgian/Russian border. As far as the Russians are concerned, they acted to defend citizens that have become more likely since 2006 to carry Russian passports than Georgian, and who were under an unprovoked attack by the Georgian government. To the Georgians, this violation of their border by the Russians is tantamount to a declaration of war by the Russians, and they are calling for international support.

Conflict became more severe on Saturday, and there are significant civilian casualties mounting in South Ossetia and, to a lesser degree, Georgia proper. The BBC reports that Russian and South Ossetian officials are reporting at least 1,400 dead, the majority civilian, while there are around 37 – 50 dead civilians on the Georgian side.

Why now has this erupted as it has? Clearly, the provocation for the conflict comes from the Georgians, but it is doubtful that the Russians do not welcome it. The Georgians likely felt that the presence of Prime Minister Putin, considered the “true” head of the Russian government, at the Olympics rather than in Moscow might make the Russians less likely to respond. In addition, there is some belief that the Georgians might have thought they had the support of, at the very least, the United States, if not all of NATO, in pacifying the rogue region. What reason did they have to believe this? American forces have been operating within Georgia for months now, helping to train Georgian forces. Georgian military have been participating as one of the states in President George W. Bush’s “Coalition of the willing,” and they have 2,000 soldiers currently in Iraq. The United States has significant interests in Georgia, both in having them join NATO and also the significant oil pipeline that runs through the state, allowing the United States and other Western states to pump fuel through the Middle East without Russian or Iranian involvement. [viii]

Further, the Georgian government has lobbyists in highly important positions. How important? Try Randy Scheunemann, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator John McCain, the presumptive nominee for the Presidency.

Tomorrow, I will examine the reactions from the White House and the two Presidential campaigns, as well as updating on the most recent activities inside Georgia.